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Chapter One: Introduction
On December 10, 2012, the presidents of the three institutions that form the framework of
the European Union jointly accepted the Nobel Peace Prize from the Nobel committee chairman
Thorbjoern Jagland. The award “... recognized more than six decades during which the conflictridden continent pulled together and became a harbinger of ‘peace and reconciliation, democracy
and human rights’ at home and beyond” and hailed the EU for its pivotal role in uniting the
European nations after two disastrous world wars (Steinhauser 2012). Nevertheless, the reaction

to the committee’s decision was mixed as many bewildered Europeans questioned why the
organization deserved the prize during a period when social and political tensions are mounting
because of the enduring economic crisis. The anti-European Union sentiment is growing as the
EU leaders are imposing austerity measures on heavily-indebted nations such as Greece, and
separatist movements are on the rise in historically-independent and prosperous regions of
Europe that aspire to break away from their national governments. The precarious situation of
political and economic instability is threatening to shift the balance of power between national
and local governments and divide the European Union along the long-buried nationalist fault
lines.

Despite the dark cloud of nationalism that is once again looming menacingly over the
European continent, the future of the EU itself is not as insecure as the current situation would
suggest. Although the leaders of separatist movements in Scotland, Belgium, Italy, Catalonia,
and the Basque Country demanded referendums on independence from the national governments,
none have plans to leave the European Union because of the recognized importance of the
supranational structure of the bloc. In addition, the separatist movements to break away from the
national government do not necessarily reflect a profound desire for independence. In October of

2012, the International Herald Tribune reported that “[pJolls indicate just more than half of the
Catalans support independence from Spain, but two in three Scotts oppose breaking the 300year-old union with England” (Morris 2012). The political instability created by the separatist
movements seems to be a political tool to put pressure on the national governments to change the
current economic situation. The dissatisfaction with the failure of the central governments to
alleviate the worsening economic crisis translates into support for the separatist movements
because of the disillusionment with the state’s policies, especially in historically-prosperous
regions with a strong cultural identity and a tradition of political autonomy, such as Catalonia
and the Basque Country. Despite the current political tensions on the continent, “...[t]he
separatist tide might ebb with the recovery of Europe’s national economies (Morris 2012).
In my thesis I explored the connection between the current economic crisis and the rise of
separatism in Europe by investigating the independence movement of the Basques and the
Catalans in northern Spain. There are several reasons why I chose Spain to study the effects of
the economy on the sub-nationalist movements: the history of strong separatist sentiments in the
region, the decentralized political structure of the state, and the devastating effect of the global
recession of 2008 on the country’s economy. Although the historical cultural ties that allowed
mobilization of the regional population and the devolved political structure that permitted the
rise of expansive local bureaucracies played an important role in creation of the separatist
sentiment in the Basque Country and Catalonia, I argued in my thesis that the economic crisis of
2008, which exacerbated the political divide between the prosperous regions with a strong
cultural identity and the central Spanish government, is responsible for increased demands for
regional separatism in Spain.

Both the Basque and the Catalan regions have a history of independence and of resistance
to the Spanish central government. The Basques retained their autonomous government system
until the nineteenth century; the Catalans lost their autonomy earlier, in the eighteenth century,
but both regions retained their distinct cultural identity and their language. Only with Franco's

assent to power in the late-1930s, did the central government attempt to suppress the identity of
ethnic minorities in Spain and mold the Basques and the Catalans into loyal Spanish citizens.
However, not even the brutal reality of the dictatorial regime could destroy the sense among the
Basques and the Catalans of being different from the rest of Spain. The Basque nationalist
leaders fought to preserve the identity of the people through underground organizations and
clandestine movements that evolved into nationalist Basque political parties after Franco’s death

in 1975. The Catalan underground nationalist movement was more fragmented throughout the
1940s and the 1950s, but it re-emerged in the 1960s through cultural mass mobilization in
Catalonia. The leaders of the these movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia guided the
regions during Spain’s transition to democracy and forced Spain’s central government to
acquiesce to some demands of political and economic autonomy.

The system of autonomous

communities that emerged under the Spanish Constitution of 1978 gave the Basque and the
Catalan regions powers over all aspects of industry, commerce, and culture in their communities.
The Basque Country also gained the right to an independent tax system. Although radical
nationalists, such as the terrorist organization ETA and Terra Lliure, continued to demand
complete independence for the regions with a strong national identity, the majority of the
Basques and the Catalans were satisfied with the autonomy concessions of the central
government and content to be a part of Spanish state, especially after the rapid economic boom
of the late 1990s. Nevertheless, the global economic crisis of 2008 exposed the long-buried

resentments and caused turmoil that revitalized the separatist movements in the Basque Country
and Catalonia. The falling output and the rising unemployment created frustration with the
central government among the regional population, and proponents of separatism used the
chaotic economic situation to rally the support for the Basque and the Catalan independence. The
increased public sympathy for separatism was reflected in the regional elections of 2012 where
radical pro-independence Basque and Catalan political parties came to power in regional
parliaments. In my thesis, I explored further the question of how the modern manifestations of
nationalism in the regional elections in Spain relate to the desire of the regions to pressure the
government into certain economic concessions.
To answer my research question of the effect of the economic crisis of 2008 on the
Spanish separatism movements, I used both political and economic data to analyze the influence
of the current economic crisis on the Basque and the Catalan separatism. In chapter two of my
thesis, I discussed the general theories of nationalist movements and chose one that I believe is
most relevant to the case of Spain sub-nationalism today; in chapter three I traced the history of
the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements in Spain and explained the similarities and
differences of the two; in chapter four I examined the “state of autonomies” created by the
Spanish Constitution of 1978, and I discussed the regional election data and its relationship to the
economic cycle in Spain; finally, in chapter five, I investigated the economic crash of 2008 in
Europe and the consequences of the falling output and the rising unemployment on the Basque
and Catalan separatist movements.
I found through my research that the desire for national sovereignty in the Basque
Country and Catalonia had lessened dramatically as Spain transitioned to democracy in 1975,
joined the supranational structure of the European Union in the early 1990s, and experienced an

economic boom from 1995 to 2008 that significantly increased the standard of living in Spain.

However, the global economic crisis of 2008 once again brought political turmoil to the regions
as radically separatist parties gained support in the regional governments. Unhappy with the
ineffective economic policies of the central government, the Basques and the Catalans turned to

ideologies that promote the idea of their ethnic difference from the rest of the Spanish people and

demand sovereignty from the Spanish government. The growth of the radical separatist
movements in Spain in response to the economic crisis shows that the nature of modern

nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia is primarily a means to greater wealth and
greater political influence. These findings suggest that nationalist movements in Europe may be

more related to political and economic objectives of the regions rather than an inherent desire to
assert the cultural differences.

Chapter Two: Theories of Nationalism
As the world became more and more unified and interdependent in the latter half of the
twentieth century, some scholars expected to see the homogenization of culture and the

dissolution of nationalist movements. Rationalists argued that the global networks of trade and
large-scale industrial societies would erase the traditional ties of religion, language, ethnicity,

and race and diminish cultural differences. Liberals maintained that democracy, which allows for
a multiple expression of one’s identity, is an antidote to the poison of nationalism. Nevertheless,
according to Smith, “... ethnic ties and national loyalties have become stronger and more deeprooted than ever” in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of the twenty-first century (Smith 1981: 1).
Ethnic separatism led to nationalist movements not only in the post-colonial states of the
developing world but also in the established democracies of Western European and North
American states. Since the late 1950s, nationalism re-emerged in the nations that invented the

idea and thought themselves to be immune from its influence in the post-WWII epoch. Even
though the dynamics of nationalist ideas changed from “blood and soil” nationalism to “value”
nationalism, the pro-independence movements of the Catalans and the Basques in Spain, of the
Scots and the Welsh in Great Britain, and of the Flemish in Belgium show that nationalism
remains a politically and socially sellable idea that unites an ethnic group under the banner of a
common national identity (King 2006). However, why does national identity matter? What
drives an ethnic group to engage in a conflict with a state in an effort to achieve regional
independence or autonomy? Although I will focus primarily on the Basque and Catalan
nationalism in my thesis, to understand the answers to these questions I will investigate three
major theories of nationalism that have broad implications on the understanding of any

autonomy movement: the theory of primordialism, the theory of constructionism, and the theory
of instrumentalism.

Primordialism is one of the earliest paradigms explaining the idea of nations and national
identification. This approach to understanding the sentiment of ethnic belonging contends that
nations are an ancient and natural phenomenon. According to the proponents of this theory,
ethnicity preceded the creation of modern state and is an enduring feature of human existence.
Belonging to a certain ethnicity creates primordial attachments that form an unshakable social
bond of shared ideas of common race, language, territory, and traditions and that create a
primordial community which membership is considered to be hereditary. “National identification
is clearly a matter of sensibility in this sense — something transmitted from the past and secured
as a collective belonging, something reproduced in myriad imperceptible ways, grounded in
everydayness and mundane experience” (Eley 1996: 22). Although primordialism encountered
enormous criticism after World War II, the theory continues “to describe scholars who hold that

nationality is a ‘natural’ part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that
nations have existed since time immemorial” (OU zkirimli 2000: 64). Thus, this approach to
understanding nationalism includes a variety of diverse explanations of the origins and strengths
of ethnic identities.

One of the major scholars of this school of thought is Anthony Smith, who uses the idea
of primordial sentiments in his theory of ethnosymbolism to argue that, although nationalism is a
modern phenomenon, nations themselves have pre-modern origins formed by historical
interactions between various ethnic groups. ' Smith believes that the pre-modern ethnic groups

* Although some debate about whether Anthony Smith is a primordialist exists among scholars, I maintain that his
use of ethnic foundations of nationalism belongs to the primordialist viewpoint. Smith’s theory does deviate from
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self-identified in various ways, such as “... size, attachment to territory, [or] secular versus
religious identity...” (Eley 1996: 10). However, the “... most fundamental difference [of these

groups] is not some objective characteristic internal to the group, but rather the discursive
universe in which it operates and realizes itself’ (Eley 1996: 10). Hence, ethnic separatism is
based upon cultural differences and a sense of cultural distinctiveness that forms an ethnic
community which demarcates itself from its neighbors and rulers and rejects the incorporation
into an alien empire (Smith 1981: 13). According to Smith, an ethnic community has six main
attributes: “a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories,
one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific
‘homeland,’ and a sense of solidarity among most members of the community” (Smith 1991: 21).
The persistence of these myths, symbols, values, and memories is the most significant part of the
sense of ethnic belonging and is the foundation of nationalism, which is “an ideological
movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of an existing or
potential ‘nation’” (Eley 1996: 108).
In his book The Ethnic Revival, Smith explains the re-emergence of nationalism in the
modern world as an unsurprising effect of globalization. He points out that rapid industrialization,
urbanization, and digitalization created a sense of loneliness and nostalgia for strong community
bonds. “To be restored to one’s cultural family, to be an equal in one’s own closed circle, to
receive the protection of one’s brethren, seems the only sure route to sanity and dignity in the
computer age,” according to Smith (Smith 1981: 3). Since current politics justify and articulate
minority rights, ethnic separatism and nationalist sentiment is a consequent result of these

classic primordialism in that it defines nationalism itself as a modern manifestation; however, his theory of
ethnosymbolism does not fit into constructivism, which maintains that nationalism is a consequence of the modern
process of constructing ethnic identities.
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modern circumstances, especially in the democratic nations of the contemporary Western Europe
where “... the state used the cultural symbols of a specific ethno-religious or ethno-linguistic
community and attempted to project this ethos in universal, national terms [throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries] (Sheth 1999: 11). Thus, the minority movements in
European nations are often characterized by an ethnic group’s expression of their differences
from a dominating state. Nevertheless, a demotic ethnic community may never have the potential
to become an organized nation, despite its primordial ties. Smith lists five steps that, in his
opinion, that mark the transition of an ethnic group to a civic nation:
1.

amovement from subordinate accommodation and passivity of a peripheral
minority to an active, assertive and politicized community;

2.

amovement toward a universally recognized “homeland” for the community, a
compact, clearly demarcated territory;

3.

economic unification of all members of the territorially demarcated community,
with control over its own resources, and movement towards economic autarchy in
ain a competitive world of nations;

4.

turning ethnic members into legal citizens by mobilizing them for political ends
and conferring on each common civil, social and political rights and obligations;

5.

placing the people at the centre of moral and political concern and celebrating the
new role of the masses, by re-educating them in national values, myths and
memories. (Eley 1996: 119).

Although the theory of primordialism explains the strength of ethnic and cultural bonds,
which caused “... large numbers of otherwise decent people [to carry] out unbelievable atrocities
for no better reason than their nation required them to,” many scholars have criticized the nature
11

of primordial explanations relating to national bonds and their ethnic origins (Poole 1999: 1).
Particularly, the belief in strong primordial attachments that are given by nature and, thus, static
is challenged by recent studies, which “‘... stress the role of individual choice in the construction

of ethnic identities...” (OOzkiriml: 2000: 75). Moreover, primordialism fails to explain clearly
the reason some ethnic groups develop a strong autonomy or separatist movement while others
are content to be a part of a centralized state.

Both the theory of constructivism and the theory of instrumentalism are explanations of
the modernism school of thought, which emerged as a counter-reaction to primordialism after
World War II. Modernism scholars theorize that nationalism can only arise in industrialized
societies with a central authority to maintain the unity of all cultural groups within a nation. They
argue that nationalism emerged in Europe only after the French Revolution of 1789 and is the
product of capitalism, centralism, and secularism, which are the pillars of the modern
bureaucratic states. Thus, “(t]he common denominator of all [modernist] studies is a belief in the
modernity of [both] nations and nationalism” (OOzkiriml1 2000: 85).

Ernest Gellner’s theory of constructivism maintains that “... nationality is not a natural
consequence or outgrowth of common culture of long antiquity; nations are not so much
discovered or awakened, as they are created or invented by the labors of intellectuals” (Eley
1996: 23). Gellner organizes human history into three stages: the hunter-gatherer, the agroliterate, and the industrial. The hunter-gatherer and the agro-literate epochs were not important to
the development of nationalism because of the discrepancy between power and culture. At that
time social mobility was almost non-existent and power was hereditary; the ruling classes used
culture to distinguish themselves from the hoi polloi. There was no incentive to impose cultural
homogenization on the pre-modern societies, and, thus, there could be no nations. The industrial
12

stage of human history marks the era of the rise of nations and nationalism. As the nature of
work changed from agricultural to industrial, the structure of the social order underwent a
profound transformation that increased mobility and emphasized individualism. A strong,
centralized state became necessary to built the infrastructure and create a universal educational
system to support a highly mechanized society. The government used nationalism as a political
tool to define the cultural norms of a society and to standardize social organization (OO zkinmli
2000:

130-132).
The constructivist historical outline of the emergence of nationalism explains regional

autonomy and separatist movements that happen within a centralized state as a result of
interactions between groups of people. According to Gellner, minority nationalism arose because
of

... labor migrations and bureaucratic employment [which] disclosed ‘the difference
between dealing with a co-national, one understanding and sympathizing with their
culture, and someone hostile to it. This very concrete experience taught [ethnic groups] to
be aware of their culture, and to love it (or, indeed, to wish to be rid of it). (OOzkinmli

2000: 134)
These ethnic minority groups have the ability to fracture the homogeneous ideals of a modern
society because of their resistance to the adoption of the standardized culture of the state. The
conflict between a minority culture and a majority culture may give rise to new nations and a
split of the homogenized state.
Miroslav Hroch, another major scholar of modernism, later defined the three concrete
stages of the development of ethnic nationalism:
13

1.

the development or improvement of a national culture based on the local language
which had to be used in education, administration and economic life;
the creation ofa complete social structure, including their ‘own’ educated elites

2.

and entrepreneurial classes;
3.

the achievement of equal civil rights and of some degree of political selfadministration (OO zkirimli 2000: 158).

According to Hroch’s theoretical constructs, an ethnic separatist movement can arise in the
modern state because of four possible social transformations:

1.

acrisis of legitimacy, linked to social, moral and cultural strains;

2.

abasic volume of vertical social mobility (some educated people must come from

the non-dominant ethnic group);
3.

a fairly high level of social communication, including literacy, schooling and

market relations;
4.

nationally relevant conflicts of interest (OOzkirmli 2000: 161-2).

The modernist paradigms of Gellner and Hroch explain the importance of an industrial
society in the processes of the formation of nationalism; however, the theories often fail to
account for the passions generated by the sentiment of nationalism and for the strength of ethnic
bonds. Gellner’s model especially
... displays all the vices of functionalist reasoning — in which events and processes occur
which are implausibly treated as wholly beyond the understanding of human agents in
which consequences precede causes, and in which suspicions arise that supra-individual

14

and holistic entities are being tacitly invoked to do explanatory work. (OUzkiriml: 2000:
137)
Although Hroch’s approach explains the reasons for ethnic revivals in modern states and defines

the criteria for the formation of nationalism more clearly than Gellner’s theory, his model is
often criticized for downplaying the importance of the political and institutional determinants of
nationalism processes.
The theory of instrumentalism also falls under the modernist school of thought; however,
this model treats ethnic nationalism as an element of a political strategy used for achieving
secondary goals, such as wealth, power, or prestige. “Ethnic identity is, in view of the
instrumentalist approach, regarded as a rational reaction to the demands of a situation or to the
social pressure within the community or from another community” (Baeova 1998: 30). Thus,
national belonging is a rational choice of the individual who understands the community as an
instrument for achieving his goals.
The idea of nationalism as a political process was proposed in John Breuilly’s book
Nationalism and the State in 1982. Although Breuilly’s explanations do not constitute a complete
theory of nationalism, his theoretical framework allows for an in-depth analysis of nationalism as
a political doctrine. He argues that nationalist dogma serves three main functions: coordination,
mobilization, and legitimacy. Breuilly states that coordination promotes the ideas of common
interests among the elites, who then mobilize the broad social strata into an organized political
movement. Legitimacy is achieved by using the “... nationalist ideas to justify the goals of the
political movement both to the state it opposes and also to powerful external agents, such as

15

foreign states and their public opinions” (OUzkirimli 2000: 109). The outline of Breuilly’s work
created a foundation for the later theories of nationalism as a method of political manipulation.
The best-known theorist of instrumentalism is Paul R. Brass, whose model has become
the “... quintessential illustration of the instrumentalist position” (OOzkirmmli 2000:

110). His

theory is based upon several basic assumptions: the variability of ethnic identities, the political
and economic origins of ethnic conflicts, the influence of the elite groups on the definition of
national identity, and the reversibility of the process of nationalism and identity formation. Brass
states that “... there is nothing inevitable about the rise of ethnic identities and their
transformation into nationalism” (OOzkirimli 2000: 110). He believes that nationalism is by
definition a political movement; its ideas are used to enhance the internal solidarity of a group in
its quest for certain rights in an existing political system or for the recognition as a separate
nation.

In his theory Brass mentions the three factors that define the success of a nationalist
movement: political organization, government policies, and political context. Since
instrumentalists identify nationalism as a political tool, it requires a “... healthy [political]
organization, skilled leadership and resources to compete effectively in the system” (OO zkinmli
2000:

113). Nationalist movements that control community resources, identify themselves with

the community, shape the identity of the groups they lead, hold the political legitimacy that can
withstand changes in leadership, and are the dominant representatives of the interests of the
ethnic group against its rivals usually form a successful political organizations (OUzkinml
2000:

114). Government policies that respond to ethnic demands are also an important

determinant of success or failure of a nationalist movement. These responses range from
genocide and deportation to a successful pluralist federation and have a great effect on ethnic
16

groups. The political context of a nationalist movement is the last major factor defined by Brass.
Although ethnic groups may demand administrative and political decentralization, only in
extreme cases, such as a dictatorship, civil war or secession movement will ensue. He states that

“ .. secessionism is a high-cost strategy which most political elites will not adopt unless all other

alternatives are exhausted and there is a reasonable prospect of external intervention in their
favour” (OU zkirimli 2000: 115).
Criticisms of the theory of instrumentalism have mainly come from the primordialists,
who claim that the sense of national identity developed in Europe before the creation of modern

politics; thus, nationalism cannot be just a political tool used by the elites. According to the
primordialists, pre-modern ethnic ties are responsible for creating a modern society where many
people are prepared to die for their country simply because of patriotic sentiments. They
complain that the theory of instrumentalism puts too much emphasis on politics while ignoring
cultural interactions of nationalism.

Even though both the theory of primordialism and the theory of constructivism have
relevance in my research of Spain’s nationalist movements, I will use the theory of
instrumentalism to show that modern manifestations of separatism in Catalonia and the Basque
Country are a political tool used to enhance the internal solidarity of the groups in their quest for
certain rights in the Spanish political system. I believe that the theory of instrumentalism best
describes the modern (after 1980) phenomenon of ethnic nationalism in Spain because the
majority of both the Basques and the Catalans began to oppose a complete separation from Spain
as the state transitioned to a democratic regime and recognized the rights of ethnic minorities on
the peninsula. The devolved state structure allowed the development of regional political systems,
and encouraged the growth of cultural identities in the autonomous communities. Although some
17

extremists in Catalonia and the Basque Country continued to fight for total independence from
Spain, the support for separatism hovered around twenty to thirty percent in the two regions
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s as Spain experienced an economic boom. However, the
debilitating economic collapse of 2008 had dire consequences on the Spanish government; the
falling output and the rising unemployment led to increasing demands for independence,

especially in Catalonia, which does not have an independent tax system like the Basque Country.
The increased separatism in Catalonia and the Basque Country (both among the richest
autonomous communities in Spain) in response to the economic crisis shows that modern ethnic
nationalism in Spain is a political tool that is used to achieve certain goals of a minority group

and will rise and fall according to the political and economic context.
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Chapter Three: The Basque and the Catalan Nationalist Movements

Throughout the history of the Iberian Peninsula, the Spanish realm has remained a
decentralized state with strong regional identities. Despite the efforts by the Castilian monarchs
to impose a uniform national identity after the expulsion of the Muslims in 1492, the various
ethnic communities of Spain clung to their own national conscience based on historical, cultural,
and linguistic traditions. Although some regions eventually became incorporated into the Spanish
empire, the communities on the periphery of the kingdom, such as the Basque Country and
Catalonia, retained their distinct cultural identities because the Spanish central government
lacked the political and economic resources to force integration. As Spain entered into the
Industrial Age in the late 1800s, these regions began developing influential separatist movements
that were led by the local elites, who felt threatened by rapid urbanization and immigration.
These separatist movements gained political legitimacy in the regions in the 1900s under the
four-decade dictatorship of General Francisco Franco, who attempted to exterminate every
manifestation of local culture in Spain. After Franco’s death in 1975, the new democratic regime

solidified the political legitimacy of ethnic nationalism by creating a state structure that devolved
administrative powers to the autonomous regions and encouraged local languages and cultures.

Although the desire for separatism has decreased in the Basque Country and Catalonia as the
state become more democratic and prosperous, the threat of separatism remained a useful
instrument in the arsenal of regional politicians; as the global economic crisis of 2008 swept over
Spain, the regional governments in the Basque Country and Catalonia demanded further
concessions of autonomy from the central government to counteract the effects of rising
unemployment in the communities and called for independence referendums when their demands
were not met.

19
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The history of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements shares many traits in
common. Both regions have maintained their unique cultural and linguistic traditions into the
modern age, and both have historically retained a certain degree of autonomy from the Spanish
state with charters, “... which exempted them from some taxes and military service requirements
over the years” (Barnes 2013). In the early twentieth century, both the Basques and the Catalans

suffered under the brutal dictatorial regime of Franco, “... who suppressed the use of regional
language or any outward display of sub-nationalism during his nearly forty-year rule” (Barnes
2013). Despite the political oppression and government crackdowns, both nationalist movements
re-emerged during Spain’s transition to democracy in the mid-1970s and have remained a strong

political force in the two regions.
However, the Basque and the Catalan nationalist movements also diverge in certain
aspects of their ideology, tactics, and goals. Until the late 1950s, the Basque nationalist leaders
have promoted an exclusionary form of identity that was based on the racial features of the
Basques while the Catalan nationalist leaders have always believed in civic identity based on
cultural assimilation. The Basque nationalist movement has always been characterized by
political violence and extremism while the Catalan nationalist movement “... has largely been
marked by peaceful calls for greater autonomy” (Barnes 2013). The Basque nationalist parties
have usually allied themselves politically with the radical left while the Catalan nationalist
parties have gravitated to the center-right. Also, since the onset of democracy in Spain, the
Basques acquired more fiscal autonomy than the Catalans and have enjoyed their own tax system.
The economic recession of 2008 has increased nationalistic fervor in Catalonia, however. While

the Basque Country, always the more extreme of the two, has remained relatively stable,

Catalonia has erupted in protests demanding independence from the government in Madrid. The
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regional government of Catalonia, led by Arturo Mas, called for a referendum on the self-rule of

the Catalans and blamed the economic turmoil in the community on the central government’s
unjust taxing policies. This surprising turnaround in levels of support for separatism in the two
regions can be explained by examining the similarities and differences between the Basque
Country and Catalonia in more detail.
Surrounded by the natural boundaries of the Pyrenees Mountains, the Bay of Biscay, and
the Ebro River lies the Basque country, a place which resisted cultural absorption by the
dominating regional powers for thousands of years. The Basque community occupies the area of
only 7,234 square kilometers in northern Spain and has a small population of 2,155,546 million
people, according to the 2008 census of the region (Avance Del Padrén Municipal a 1 De Enero
De 2008). Nevertheless, the Basque people maintained their autonomy and their system of selfgovernance called fueros through the Second Carlist War of the late nineteenth century and
remain an ethnic community with one of the most defined separatist movements in Western
Europe to this day.
Catalonia, which also lies in northern Spain, is much bigger than the Basque Country.
The community covers the area of 32,114 square kilometers and has a population of 7,535,251
million people (Avance Del Padrén Municipal a I De Enero De 2008). The Catalan national
identity has its roots in the Middle Ages, when the area “... emerged as a defined territory and
jurisdiction with its own language and culture” (Keating 2001: 115). Although the region’s
sovereignty was suppressed by the Spanish monarchy in the War of Spanish Succession of the
early 1700s, Catalonia retained its distinctive cultural traditions as it adapted to being a part of
Spanish state. The Catalan language remained the vernacular of the area, and the history of
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independence provided a rallying cry for the periodic rebellions which “... fostered a romantic

sense of separate identity and fixation with the past” among the Catalans (Keating 2001: 117).
The modern form of both the Basque and the Catalan nationalism arose in the late 1800s
and the early 1900s as rapid industrialization was sweeping across the European continent. The
two regions were the first ones in Spain to industrialize and urbanize; the resulting social
changes led to a questioning of one’s roots and identity and to a romanticizing of one’s cultural
heritage. The regional elites, threatened by the rapid immigration into the regions, encouraged
the growth of ethnic nationalist movements in order to protect their economic and political
influence.

The Basque nationalist movement was indirectly caused by the Spanish abolishment of

the fueros under the constitution of 1876. Because the fueros of the Basque country “...
prohibited the extraction and exportation of the province’s natural resources,” the region began
to industrialize only with the dissolution of the Basque self-governance system (Clark 1979: 35).
Fueled by the rich deposits of iron ore and inflows of foreign finances, the Basque country
transformed from an agrarian society to an industrial giant in less than a decade. The rapid
industrialization, which brought an influx of Spanish immigrants into the Basque community,
altered the social climate of the region and allowed the sentiment of nationalism to emerge as a
powerful political force.

Feeling their traditional values threatened by the forces of urbanization

and immigration, the Basque middle class propounded an ideology of racial superiority which
aimed to strengthen its position of power and influence in the society. This ideology of the early
Basque ethnic movement focused on the purity of the Basque blood and the Basque language to

demonstrate the racial superiority of the Basques. The “blood and soil” nationalism demanded a
Basque country free from the influence of the central Spanish government.
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The Catalan nationalist movement arose out of the economic and cultural renaissance in
the area in the late nineteenth century. Cultivated by Catalan intelligentsia, the nationalist
sentiment in Catalonia became more popular among the people as the region experienced a
cultural and literary revival which “... instilled a strong collective consciousness in most
Catalans...” (McRoberts 2001: 22). This consciousness manifested itself in the political arena as
the Catalan revival transitioned to organized nationalist movements which demanded self-

government for the region.
A major proponent of the Basque nationalist movement was Sabino de Arana,
deservingly called “the father of the Basque nationalism” (MacClancy 1996: 209). He worked
tirelessly to advance the study of Euskera through the publication of newspaper articles, text
books, and history books. He founded Basque culture centers and designed the Basque national
flag ikurrifia. However, Sabino de Arana’s most important contributions to the Basque
nationalist movement were the foundation of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which is still
an active participant in the political elections of the region, and the organization of the nationalist
ideology (Clark 1979: 43). In the book Bizkaya por su independencia, he laid out the six
important principles of the Basque nationalist sentiment: the significance of Catholicism, the
unification of all Basque territories, the purity of the Basque people, the value of Euskera as a
distinguishing factor of the Basques, the non-violent principles of the independence, and the
democratic political structure of region (Clark 1979: 44). Even though these six principles were
altered as Basque nationalism was transformed through the Franco dictatorship and the
democratization of the 1970s, all of the subsequent Basque ideological movements can be traced
to Sabino de Arana’s work.
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The first prominent political leader of the Catalan nationalist movement was Valenti
Almirall, who was the mastermind behind the organizing “*... Catalanism into a coherent political
movement...” (McRoberts 2001: 24). He arranged the First Catalan Congress in 1880 in order to

co-ordinate the efforts of the many different Catalan organizations, he established the Academia
de la Llengua Catalana to standardize and promote the Catalan language, and he pushed for
policies to protect the ancient Catalan civil law code from Spain. (McRoberts

2001: 24). In

addition, Almirall founded the first newspaper that was published in Catalan (Keating 2001: 118).
Valenti Almirall was, in many ways, the Sabino Arana of Catalan nationalism; however, his
theory radically differed from Arana’s exclusionary vision. “While Arana promoted a more
primordial [and] racial ... form of nationalism, Almirall ... [was] more civic-minded and tolerant
of the outsiders who came to Catalonia and assimilated” (Barnes 2013). The Catalan nationalists
did not consider the purity of blood, so important to the Basque nationalists, as the defining
factor of belonging to the Catalan community; “[f]or the most part, as long as one learned
Catalan [language] and adhered to the culture, one could be considered Catalan” (Barnes 2013).

The Basque nationalist movement was solidified by the civil conflict that shook Spain
throughout the 1930s. In The Basques: the Franco Years and Beyond, Clark describes the
Spanish Civil War as
... one of those rare psychological moments in history when an entire culture passes
through an experience of deepest significance, and is never quite the same again. Time
after time, the leaders of the culture find themselves returning to that experience as they
search for ways to make Basques more aware of the meaning of their ethnic heritage and
of their existence as human beings. (Clark 1979: 76)
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Although the victory of General Francisco Franco at the end of the Civil War forced most of the
Basque nationalists into exile, the resistance of the Basques only increased throughout the 1940s
and the 1950s. The Basque Nationalist Party, covertly supported by the French government,
continuously spread pro-nationalist propaganda throughout Spain and worked to enlist the aid of
Western democracies, such as Great Britain and the United States, in pressuring the antidemocratic Spanish central government. Despite Franco’s efforts to eradicate the use of Euskera
within the Basque Country, clandestine groups operated countless printing presses and radio
broadcasts to promote the Basque cause. In the early 1950s, one of these culture groups laid the
foundations for a terrorist organization later known as ETA.
The Catalan nationalist movement also suffered greatly after the Spanish Civil War under
the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco. Catalonia remained a Republican stronghold until
the very end of the war; outnumbered and surrounded by the Nationalist armies of General
Franco, the Republican forces fled Barcelona in early 1939, leaving Catalonia at the mercy of the
enemy. Although Franco assured the Catalans that their culture would be respected under the
new regime, he immediately mounted a campaign against the Catalan traditions. All newspapers
and books published in Catalan were banned, and signs or advertisements in Catalan were
prohibited (Johnston 1991: 29). The Catalan teachers were replaced by the Spanish ones loyal to
Franco’s regime and the Catalan nationalist organizations were suppressed (Johnston 1991: 30).

Even on the streets, “[n]otices appeared that demanded, “[i]f you are Spanish, speak Spanish,” or,
“[s]peak the language of the Empire” (Johnston 1991: 29).
The political repression had a profound effect on the Catalan nationalism. ““A whole

generation grew up, speaking Catalan at home but unable to read or write the language” (Keating
2001: 120). Most of the intellectual and political leaders of the Catalan nationalist movement
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were exiled, imprisoned, or executed throughout the 1940s. Unlike the united Basque

government in exile, the Catalan leadership that fled to France and Mexico was badly divided
into different factions and unable to coalesce into a cohesive organization to fight the
dictatorship (McRoberts 2001: 40). However, new nationalist leaders, with ideas that were “...

quite distinct from the old-guard remaining from pre-civil war days,” emerged in Catalonia in the
1960s (Keating 2001: 121). Emboldened by the European support of national minorities after the
end of World War II, young leaders of Catalan nationalism demanded liberty, democracy, and
autonomy. “[T]he ironical outcome of [Franco’s] repression [in Catalonia] was to strengthen

Catalan identity, since it united opponents of the regime, from the far left to conservative
Catholics, and ensured that a return to democracy would be identified with a return to selfgovernment” (Keating 2001: 120).

In the Basque Country, resistance to the political oppression of Franco began to take a
militant turn in the early 1960s. Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) was formed in 1952 by a small

group of university students who organized a literary club to discuss contemporary political
issues. The members of the group discussed nationalist discourses and eventually started
publishing a series of essays called Ekin, which focused on the restoration of Basque autonomy

(Clark 1984: 25). As the organization grew, their leaders attempted to merge the group with the
resistance movement of the Basque Nationalist Party; however, the students soon became

frustrated with the non-militant approach of the vanguard of the Basque nationalism. In 1959
several of the founders of the club began propounding an ideology that differed radically from
that of the nationalist leaders of the resistance movement. In contrast to the Basque Nationalist

Party’s goal of an autonomous Basque community, ETA demanded the creation of the Basque
state completely independent from the Spanish government (Clark 1984: 25). In order to gain

26

support among both the Basque and the non-Basque population of the region, ETA members
concentrated on the cultural aspects of nationalism rather than the racial ones. Instead of
worrying about the purity of the Basque blood, they focused on the survival of Euskera as “the
maximum expression of the national personality” (MacClancy 1996: 211).
Throughout the 1960s ETA focused its efforts on the creation of a coherent ideology and
the tactical strategy to fight the central government. Internal disputes over nationalist principles
led to several splits within the group; however, ETA “‘... seemed to possess an amazing ability to
attract new members, to reorganize, and to return to the political struggle” (Clark 1984: 57).
Nevertheless, these internal struggles seemed to have an unintended consequence on the
ideology of ETA: the organization became “... more radicalized and increasingly committed to
armed struggle...” after every schism (Clark 1984: 57).
On July 18, 1961, ETA carried out its first act of sabotage. Even though the organization
took great care to avoid injuring any innocent bystanders, the central Spanish government,
disregarding all fundamental human rights, responded to the situation with extreme violence. The
officials of the Spanish state arrested suspects without any evidence and often denied them the
right of habeas corpus. Both ETA members and Basque nationalism supporters were sometimes
tortured to obtain confessions of their crimes. “‘At the time of Franco’s death ... there were
approximately 1,250 persons in Spanish jails for political crimes, mostly ‘illicit association,’
propaganda, and other crimes of conscience” (Clark 1984: 171). Not surprisingly, ETA enjoyed
great popularity within the Basque community as a result of the central government’s brutal
repressions. The popular support gave ETA a sense of political legitimacy and allowed the
organization to continue their radical struggle for an independent Basque state even as the
Spanish government began rapidly democratizing its political system.
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The death of Franco on 20 November 1975 marked the end of an era of political

repressions and allowed the Spanish state to forge a new relationship between the central
government and the Basque country and Catalan nationalist leaders. Franco’s successor Juan
Carlos, who was crowned the King of Spain on November 22™, 1975, immediately proclaimed a
general amnesty for nearly all political prisoners (except those persons held for suspected
terrorism). He also committed to bringing more liberal political figures into the Cabinet and
passing a law to permit political parties (Clark 1979: 271).
Nevertheless, Franco’s oppressive rule undermined the legitimacy of the very idea of the
Spanish state within the Basque region. Despite the rapid liberalization of the Spanish central
government, unrest erupted all over the Basque country as the nationalists demanded a clean
slate for all of the Basque political prisoners (including those held on the charges of terrorism).
Several months into the transition period, violent protests on the streets exploded into
unrestrained fighting between police and demonstrating workers and students (Clark 1979: 269).
The turmoil was only exacerbated by the economic recession of the 1970s which caused
increased unemployment rates in the region (Clark 1984: 87).
In contrast with the Basque Country, Catalonia remained relatively politically stable

throughout Spain’s transition to democracy. After the death of Franco, the Catalans petitioned
the central government to restore the Generalitat de Catalunya, which was the autonomous

government of the region prior to the Civil War in Spain. Although some demonstrations to
support Catalan autonomy in the democratic Spanish state were organized in Barcelona, the
Catalans waited until the first general elections of 1977 to express their support of the nationalist
forces, which dominated the vote in Catalonia.
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Amidst the tensions caused by Franco’s death, ETA had gone through an ideological and
tactical transformation that split the organization into the military wing and the political wing
(Clark 1979; 278). Although both groups dedicated their work to the independence of the
Basques, the political division of ETA proposed a strategy that depended on the conventional
party system in Spain. In the spring of 1977, the political part of ETA became an “... electorally

oriented party know as EJA,” an acronym for the Basque Revolutionary Party (Clark 1979: 281).
Nevertheless, the military wing of ETA refused to consider the moderate approach to the
revolutionary struggle. The military group “... became a [small], self-styled revolutionary
vanguard force whose mission it was to carry out the more daring and risky attack against the
symbols of Spain and of capitalist exploitation” (Clark 1979: 278). In 1978 “... ETA killed more
people than it had in all of the preceding years combined” (Clark 1984: 88). The brutal murders
and violent kidnappings slowly transformed the public image of ETA from patriots fighting for
the liberation of the Basque people to terrorists who should be pursued and eliminated.
Although the process of democratization in Spain slowly undermined the legitimacy of
clandestine revolutionary groups such as ETA, neither the Basque nor the Catalan nationalist
movement disappeared as a relic of the past. Instead, as “... Spain moved to dismantle the
Francoist legacy and to reinstitute an Iberian version of parliamentary democracy,” the
nationalists eagerly took up their swords in the emerging arena of open votes and political
bargaining. (Clark 1979: 301).
In the summer of 1977, free elections were held in Spain for the first time in forty years,
and “voters in the four Basque provinces cast slightly more than 1,315,000 ballots (about 7.7
percent of the total Spanish vote of 17.5 million) to choose 26 delegates to the Congress...”
(Clark 1979: 328). Because of the strong affiliation of the Basques with the political left, the
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Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) achieved a narrow victory with 25.0 percent of the

vote. However, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), winning 24.4 percent of the vote,
established itself as a major nationalist player in the region.

Voting Patterns in the Basque country 1977
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The rest of the votes, as demonstrated by the chart above, were spread over a wide array of
Basque and Spanish political parties participating in the elections, such as the Union of
Democracy Centre (UCD), the Basque Social Coordinator (EE), and the coalition of the Basque
Social Convergence (ESB) and the Basque National Action (ANV).

In Catalonia, “[the center-right political] parties committed to autonomy won 80 per cent
of the popular vote...” in the general elections (McRoberts 2001: 48). Out of the 63 Catalan
delegates to Spain’s lower and upper houses, 52 were from the political parties which supported
Catalan nationalism and were determined to fight for the restoration of the autonomous rights in
Catalonia under the new Spanish Constitution (McRoberts 2001: 48).
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The Party of the Socialists of Catalonia (PSC) won 28.8% if the vote, almost 10% more than the

coalition of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia and the Initiative for Catalonia (PSUC/IC).
Convergence and Union (CiU) won

16.9%, only 0.1% more than the Union of the Democratic

Centre (UC). Both the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and the coalition of Popular Alliance
and People’s Party (AP/PP)

won

around 4%

of the vote. In stark contrast to the politically

fragmented vote pattern of the Basque Country, the majority of the vote in Catalonia went to the
Catalan political parties. Other parties only won

around

12%

of the vote in Catalonia while

almost 25% of the vote in the Basque Country went to a wide array of small political groups.

The autonomous
political agenda after the

rights of the two regions remained an important issue on Spain’s
1977 elections as the Basque and the Catalan people demanded

guarantee of their democratic rights and protection of their ethnic identities in the new Spanish
government. The representatives of the Basque Nationalist Party, coordinating their efforts with
the rest of the pro-independence
Workers’

Basque

political

parties, convinced

Party to support the provisions for autonomous

Basque

the Spanish

Socialist

administration in the new

Spanish constitution, which was approved in 1978. The representatives of the Catalan nationalist
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a

parties also demanded recognition of the Catalan distinctiveness within Spain and a form of selfgovernment for the people of Catalonia.
As I have shown in this chapter, the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements are
largely a product of the regions’ political mobilization against the Spanish state. Although the
primordial ties of a common culture and of a common language played a role in the formation of
the ethnic nationalism in these two Spanish regions, the rise of ethnic identities was not an
inevitable process caused by cultural and linguistic variables; rather, nationalist ideas were used
by the elites to enhance the internal solidarity of the Basque and Catalan ethnic groups as a
reaction to the external factors of industrialization, immigration, and political oppression. The
elites, such as the nationalist leaders Sabino de Arana and Valenti Almirall, then mobilized the
broad social strata into an organized political movement in their quest for certain rights in the
existing political system in the early 1900s. The nationalist movements gained further support
and legitimacy among the ethnic groups in the 1930s when the dictatorial regime of Franco
attempted to suppress all manifestations of ethnic identities in Spain. The brutal political
oppression ensured that the return to the democracy would be associated with the demand for
regional rights and the solidification of the legitimacy of the ethnic nationalist movements in
both national and regional politics.
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Chapter Four: The Spanish Constitution and the Regional Statutes of Autonomy
The Spanish Nation, desiring to establish justice, liberty and security, and to promote the
well-being of all its members, in the exercise of its sovereignty, proclaims its will to:
Guarantee democratic co-existence under the Constitution and the law, in accordance
with a fair social and economic order; Consolidate a State of Law which ensures the rule

of law as an expression of the popular will; Protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in
the exercise of human rights, of their cultures and traditions, and of their languages and
institutions; Promote the progress of culture and of the economy in order to ensure a
worthy quality of life for all; Establish a democratic and advanced society; and
Collaborate in the strengthening of peaceful relations and effective cooperation amongst
all the peoples of the world. Wherefore, the Cortes pass and the Spanish people ratify the
following Constitution (The Spanish Constitution 1978: Preamble).

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 was “... a marvel of compromise and consensus”
(Mar-Molinero 1996: 82). The central government, while maintaining that the Spanish nation is
the united and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards, acknowledged and guaranteed “... the right
to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which form [Spain] and the solidarity among them”
(Conversi 1997: 144). In addition to recognizing Spain’s multinational character, the drafters of
the Constitution acknowledged Spain’s multilingual and multicultural nature; although Castilian
was declared the official language of the Spanish state, other languages on the Iberian Peninsula
were allowed official status in their respective regions. The Constitution also recognized and
protected historical rights of the foral territories, which permitted autonomous regions to invoke
the privileges they enjoyed prior to Franco’s ascent to power. These provisions for autonomy in
the Spanish constitution allowed national minorities to form a regional government which
controlled the functions of commerce, industry, transportation, labor, health, culture, education,

and agriculture in their administrative district (Clark 1979: 360).
The right of the Spanish ethnic nationalities to self-government was guaranteed by the
second article of the Spanish Constitution; however, the Constitution did not establish a
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definitive model of the autonomous system. Rather, the drafters of the Constitution created a

legal process through which this autonomous structure could develop in Spain (Hernandez
Lafuente 1999: 20). The legal process, discussed in the third chapter of the document, began with
the Constitution’s recognizing the fifty pre-existing provinces of Spain created in the 19" century
to facilitate the state’s administration. The fifty provinces formed the foundations of the
autonomous communities in Spain, which the Constitution defined as “adjacent provinces with
common historical, cultural, and economic characteristics; insular territories; or a single province
with a historical regional identity” (The Spanish Constitution 1978: Art. 143). The Constitution
also specified the political framework of the autonomous communities — a parliamentary system
with an assembly elected by universal suffrage, a council of government, a court of justice, and a
regional president elected by the assembly (The Spanish Constitution 1978: Art. 152). After
defining autonomous communities and their institutional framework, the Constitution delineated
two ways to achieve autonomy: the route established by Article 151 specifically for the ethnic
nationalities of the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia (the communities that had a Statute
of Autonomy prior to Franco’s regime) and the route for the rest of the Spanish regions (The
Spanish Constitution 1978: Art. 151).
The Basque and the Catalan Statutes of Autonomy were approved by the Cortes
Generales (the Spanish Parliament) in December of 1979, almost a year after the Spanish

Constitution was enacted by a public referendum. The Basque Statute of Autonomy organized
the three historical provinces of Alava, Gipuzkoa, and Biscay into a political system of the
Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. As specified by the Spanish Constitution, the
Basque Statute established a parliamentary government elected by universal suffrage from the
three provinces of the Basque Country; under this electoral system, each province was
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responsible for electing twenty-five representatives to the Basque Parliament. The Basque
government was given legislative powers over all aspects of industry, commerce, and culture in
the Basque country. Notably, the parliament was also given the right of fiscal independence
(making it one of the two autonomous communities in Spain with its own tax code) because the

Basque country had historically held this power through the ancient system of fueros. The
independent fiscal regime meant that the Basques would not only have the ability to manage the
region’s finances, similarly to the rest of Spain’s autonomous communities, but also the right to
levy and collect all taxes (“The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country” 1979).
The Catalan Statute of Autonomy formed the four provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida,

and Tarragona into the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. The Catalan Statute established a
parliamentary system of government called the Generalitat de Catalunya, which consisted of the
legislature, the president of the legislature, and the executive council. Under the Constitution of
1978, the Generalitat received the jurisdiction over matters of culture, transportation, commerce,

and public safety in the region; however, Catalonia was not allowed the independent tax system

of the Basque country. The absence of the independent taxing power meant a lack of any fiscal
control of the Catalan economy, and, thus, displeased the Catalans. However, the Constitution

“... did offer a framework within which Catalonia could finally achieve some autonomy” and
assert openly its cultural identity (McRoberts 2001: 56).

Following the Basque and the Catalan example, the rest of the Spanish provinces
organized into autonomous communities. By 1983, seventeen autonomous communities formed
in Spain: Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Canary Islands,
Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and Leén, Catalonia, Madrid, Extremadura, Galicia, La

Rioja, Murcia, Navarre, and Valencian Community. Only eight out of the seventeen communities
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identified as nationalities; the others organized into autonomous communities based on regional
ties.

Spain’s Autonomous Communities

ea]

Source: Map of Spain’s Autonomous Communities

The political system of autonomous communities instituted by the Constitution of 1978
created a highly decentralized Spanish state that devolved power to regional autonomous
communities. In many ways, the decentralized political system was beneficial to the country
struggling with the challenge of democratization after a four-decade dictatorship. As mentioned
by The Economist, such a system “... spread power and impeded its concentration, ... brought
decisions about services closer to the people, ... encouraged [creative] competition between
regions, ... and reduced regional inequalities” (“How Much is Enough?” 2008). However, the
recent economic crisis in Europe exposed the high cost of the devolved political system, both to
businesses and taxpayers in Spain. Because each community had an autonomous government,
multiple regional and local bureaucracies developed throughout Spain; and, every regional
government wanted “... its own universities, contemporary-art museum, and a science museum

... (“How Much is Enough?” 2008). Joseph Ramoneda, the head of the Centre of Contemporary
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Culture in Barcelona said, “In the United States, there is only one Hollywood. Here, they want
seventeen” (“How Much is Enough?” 2008). The decentralized political system proved to be a

liability in the economic crash of 2008 as the regions demanded more and more fiscal autonomy
from the Spanish central government.
Longitudinal Election and Economic Analysis
Although I examined in detail the political consequences of the economic crisis of 2008
in Chapter Five, in this section I discussed the longitudinal election and economic data for the
Basque Country and Catalonia to show the instrumental nature of modern nationalist demands in
the two regions. The three charts below show the economic variables of the growth rate of the
gross domestic product (the annual percentage increase of everything that a country’s economy
produces in a year), the gross domestic product per capita (the measurement of how prosperous a
country feels to each of its citizens), and the unemployment rate of Spain. As the charts illustrate,
the GDP per capita experienced tremendous upward growth and, despite the upward and
downward trends of the GDP growth rate and the unemployment rate, the GDP growth rate
remained high and the unemployment rate lowered significantly in the period between 1980 and
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In the period from 2008 to 2011, the GDP growth rate and the GDP per capita lowered
significantly while the unemployment levels rose to almost twenty percent. The economic crisis
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had political effects in regional elections, as is shown in the charts below of the Basque and the
Catalan parliamentary elections.
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The Catalan regional parliamentary election data shows that the overall support of the
Catalan parties has remained high in the period from 1980 to 2012. However, the percentage
declined sharply in the period from 1995 to 2003 as Spain entered the “Golden Decade” of the
financial boom and the economy prospered. Spanish parties with political allegiance to the
central government, such as the People’s Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
(PSOE), began to acquire more popular support among the Catalan people in that period. The
Catalan parties once again began to gain support in 2004 as a result of the Catalan parliament’s
push for more fiscal autonomy in the region. The onset of the economic crisis in 2008 continued
the trend of growing support for the Catalan political parties among the people of the region.
Moreover, the two recent years of the economic crisis have seen an increase of the support for
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the Catalan left parties, which actively push for a complete separation of Catalonia from Spain
and eschew the autonomy demands of the Catalan center-right parties.
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The Basque Country regional parliamentary election data shows that, similarly to the
Catalan trends, the support for the Basque political parties declined steadily while the support for
the non-Basque political parties grew progressively since the beginning of the economic boom in
Spain in 1995. At the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, the support for the Basque political
parties, and in particular the Basque left parties, increased sharply.
The shift to the political left in both the Basque Country and Catalonia during the crisis
may raise the question of whether the change was caused purely by political ideologies. However,
as I showed in two charts below, the trend in both regions is to give increased support to local
parties which demand autonomy or separatism in the time of economic crisis to pressure the
central government to take certain measures. To illustrate this point, I showed that support for
both PSOE (a left-wing Spanish party) and PP (a right-wing Spanish party) declined in the
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Basque Country during the recent economic crisis. In Catalonia popular support for PSOE fell
sharply, but the percent of the vote remained fairly steady for PP over the past two years.
Nevertheless, both in the Basque Country and Catalonia, the support for the regional parties
increased greatly during the economic crisis of 2008.
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the data presented in this chapter shows that the
trajectory of the modern Basque and

catalan nationalist movements was greatly influenced by the decentralized political structure of

the Spanish state created by the Constitution of 1978. The autonomous regional governments

weaved a powerful local bureaucracy that had the means to mobilize the masses under the banner

of ethnic identity in order to demand more concessions from the central government in the time
of economic crisis. Although I examined the details of the economic crisis of 2008 in the next

chapter, the cursory political analysis of the longitudinal election data in this chapter shows that
the local parties with nationalist ideology gained political momentum in the Basque Country and
Catalonia as a consequence of the global economic crisis.
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Chapter Five: The Economic Crisis and the Rise of Separatism
After a strong recovery from the global recession of the early 1990s, Spain experienced a
growth spurt which propelled the economy into a long period of fiscal stability and national

prosperity, known as the “Golden Decade.” As we can see from the charts below, Spain enjoyed
aremarkable growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), increased GDP per capita, and a

consistently low unemployment rate from 1995 to 2007. The Spanish government successfully
reduced budget deficits inherited from the recession and even ran a moderate budget surplus in
the early 2000s. The Spanish economic miracle brought the country suffering from the
isolationist legacy of Franco’s repressive regime into the modern age; Spain joined the euro zone
in the early 2000s as a major industrial European power (Etxzarretta 2011: 3).
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Despite the astounding economic growth period that lasted for more than a decade,
Spain’s economic miracle proved to be unsustainable under the internal and external pressures of
the global economic crisis which began in 2008. The economic boom in Spain was based mostly
on labor-intensive and service sectors, such as construction and tourism; the growth of these
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industries was financed by the cheap loan rates throughout the 2000s. The importance of these
sectors on the growth of the Spanish economy is shown by the fact that “[b]y the end of the 2008,
the stock of loans to real estate developers and builders reached the equivalent to 50% of Spain’s
GDP” (Elteto 2011: 43). The onset of the international financial crisis in 2008, which cast doubts

upon bank solvency and caused declines in credit availability, burst the real estate bubble in
Spain and forced the restructuring of the construction sector. The unemployment rate jumped
rapidly to 21.3% and left in its wake an attitude of discontent and distrust among the Spanish
people. The deepening recession forced the government to take measures to better the ailing

economy.
The first reaction of the Spanish government to the economic crisis was political: an
attempt to mitigate the damaging effects of the recession on the population. By 2009 the
government of the Spain’s socialist Prime Minister José Zapatero had poured almost ninety
billion euros into the stimulus program that was designed to jumpstart the economy by creating
thousands of new jobs (Mallet 2008). Unfortunately, increased government spending and tax cuts
did not lead to the expected economic growth; instead, Spain’s budget deficit ““... increased
dramatically to 4.2% of GDP in 2008 and to 11% in 2009” (Elteto 2011: 46). The huge budget
deficit forced the Spanish government to abandon the stimulus program and change its fiscal
policy in 2010.
In 2011 the government of José Zapatero suffered a crushing defeat in the national
elections, and the leader of the center-right Popular Party Mariano Rajoy became the Prime
Minister of Spain. In order to regain the confidence of the international fiscal markets, Rajoy
committed to reducing the budget deficit to 3% of the GDP by 2013. His government
implemented restrictive and revenue increasing measures that increased taxes, decreased state
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expenditures, and froze wages for public employees (Elteto 2011: 46). Despite hundreds of

strikes that erupted in Spain to protest the austerity measures, the Spanish government firmly
continued its policy of cutting the budget deficit.
In addition to the growing public discontent, the harsh austerity measures and the
worsening economic situation created another major problem for the government of Mariano
Rajoy: increasing support for regional separatism in the historically independent and prosperous
communities of Catalonia and the Basque country. Throughout the decade of the rapid economic
growth in Spain, nationalist tensions somewhat declined as the people enjoyed the benefits of a
rising standard of living. However, the economic crisis of 2008 caused ancient resentments to
flare up again as a rising tide of nationalism and national territoriality flooded Catalonia and the
Basque country.

The Catalan Protests

On July 10, 2010, more than a million Catalans under the slogan “we are a nation, we
decide” occupied the central plaza of Barcelona to protest the limitations of autonomy of
Catalonia within Spain. The demonstration was a response to the Spanish parliament’s refusal to
approve the amendments to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy that would allow the Generalitat de
Catalunya the power to modify the fiscal policy and adjust the tax system of the region (Rico
2010). As one of the largest marches in Catalonia since the death of Franco, the protest showed
the growing concern of the population about the worsening economic situation in Spain and
foreshadowed the nationalistic tensions that would arise out of the ruins of the collapsing
housing market.
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In the Catalan parliamentary elections of November 2010, the leader of the center-right
Catalan nationalist coalition Convergence and Union (CiU) Artur Mas replaced José Montilla of

the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party as the president of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Mas “...
rallied voters by insisting that ‘Catalans are giving too much to Spain,’”3 and he promised to
achieve a greater budgetary independence of Catalonia from the central government in his
electoral platform (Minder 2010). The elections heightened political tension in the region, and
the autonomy movement in Catalonia gained support as Mas was forced to implement a “10%
cut in public spending and social welfare...” for the 2011 Catalan budget (“Barcelona: Angry
Crowd Pursues Catalan MPs” 2011).
The nationalistic fervor intensified in Catalonia as economic output continued to fall and
unemployment continued to skyrocket in Spain in 2011 and 2012. In August of 2012, Catalonia
requested $6.4 billion from the $24 billion emergency fund “... set up by Madrid to help regions
service their debts and pay suppliers of health care and other basic services” (Minder 2012). The
humiliating bailout sparked indignation among the Catalans, who believe that their region pays
more into the Spain’s communal tax system than it receives. As one of the wealthiest districts in
Spain, Catalonia has some of the highest tax rates and the biggest regional debt in the country.
The region’s “‘... fiscal deficit — the difference between the money it pays to Madrid and, after
taking some funds to pay state costs, the money it gets back — is [almost $21 billion], or 8% of
the region’s GDP, according to the Catalan government” (Tremlette 20 November 2012). Many
Catalans feel that their hard work finances the poorer regions of Spain, such as Andalusia and
Extremadura, and that Catalonia does not receive enough funding from the central government.
As one of the protesters said at a separatist rally, “[the Catalans] pay Swedish-style taxes but
have Senegalese-style public services” (Tremlette 20 November 2012).
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As shown by the illustration above, Catalonia is
the fourth richest autonomous community in

Spain (after Madrid, the Basque Country, and Navarre). However, after
the central Spanish
government in Madrid collects and re-distributes the taxes, the Catalan rank drops
down to the
ninth richest region in Spain (Gonzales 2012).
On September 11, 2012, the national holiday of Catalonia, one and a half million
Catalans took the streets of Barcelona, waving striped yellow-and-red Catalan flags and signs, to

demand independence from Spain (Abend 2012). The polls published that week by Catalonia’s
Center for Opinion Studies showed that the percentage of Catalans supporting independence
doubled to almost fifty percent of the population of the region since 2008 (Blitzer 2012).
Although Arturo Mas, the leader of the Generalitat de Catalunya, did not take part in the rally, he

endorsed the demands of the separatists; exploiting the tense political situation, he decided to call

for elections in Catalonia two years earlier than scheduled and
push for a Catalan referendum on
self-determination.
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The early elections in Catalonia were held on November 25, 2012; although nationalist
parties who supported Catalan independence won an overwhelming majority of the seats in the
Catalan parliament, the results of the election were an unpleasant surprise to Arturo Mas: his
party CiU, while maintaining its majority in the parliament, lost 12 seats or almost 7% of the
popular vote (Departament De Governacié I Relacions Institucionals 2012).
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Even though CiU lost ground in the elections, which will complicate Mas’ referendum
for self-determination of the region, the results show that support for radical separatism is on the
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rise in Catalonia. The Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), a strongly separatist Catalan party,
almost doubled its representation in the regional government (Tremlett 26 November 2012).

“Two thirds of the electorate voted for parties that are in favor of calling an independence
referendum...” (Heckle 2012). Nevertheless, the pro-unity parties of People’s Party of Catalonia
(PPC) and Citizen’s Party of the Citizenry (C’s) also remain a strong political force in the
regional government with 28 seats in the Generalitat de Catalunya.

The Basque Protests

Even though the Basque country has been associated with political turmoil since the
1970s, the region remained surprisingly stable throughout the economic crisis of 2008 in Spain.
The Basques staged several anti-austerity protests in major metropolitan centers of the
autonomous community, and demanded once again the return of ETA prisoners to the Basque
country after ETA’s declaration of ceasefire in October 2011. However, the Basques shied away
from the violent demonstrations of the Catalans and expressed their disappointment with the
Spanish economy through the regional elections of 2012.
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One of the major reasons that the Basque country has remained relatively stable
throughout the economic crisis is that the region was not as negatively impacted by the downturn
as the rest of Spain. Never a tourism hotspot because of the constant threat of terrorism and cold,
rainy weather year-round, the Basque country avoided the home construction frenzy, which
destroyed the economy of Spain’s southern regions. Instead, the Basques focused on developing
manufacturing and technology sectors that now boast “strong companies with local roots such as
BBVA (banking), Iberdrola (electricity), CAF (trains) and Gamesa (wind turbines)...” (Mallet

2012). These companies have strong international connections with the more vibrant markets of
Asia and South America and are thriving despite the economic crisis sweeping across Spain and
the Eurozone. The Basque country, only 4.5% of Spain’s population, makes up almost 10% of
total Spanish exports; the emphasis on industry spared the Basques the brunt of the economic
crisis (Frayer 2012). The unemployment rate, shown in the table above, is only 13.6% for the
Basque country, the lowest out of all the autonomous communities in Spain. Because of the

relative economic stability and the autonomous tax system which does not require annual
transfers of the region’s wealth, the Basque country did not explode into chaotic separatist
movements at the onset of the economic crisis in Spain.
Even though the Basque country did not erupt with the separatist sentiment as a result of
the economic crisis, the Spanish economy still worries the Basque region as much as the rest of
Spain. As can be seen from the chart below, a negative attitude about the economy permeates the
Basque population. The pessimism about the Spanish economy led to disillusionment among the
Basque country; although, according to the data collected by Euskobarémetro, only 30% of the
Basques currently support complete independence from Spain, the recent elections in the Basque
region ousted the Basque leader of the Spanish Socialist Worker’s party and brought several
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separatist Basque parties into power, including the previously banned political parties of ETA’s
political wing.
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Following the lead of Arturo Mas’ early elections in Catalonia, the president of the
Basque Country Patxi Lopez of the Basque Socialist Party (PSE-EE) called for elections on
October 21, 2012, a year earlier than required. Elected in 2009, Lopez was the first president of

the Basque Country in almost 30 years not to be affiliated with the Basque Nationalist Party
(PNV); as well as the worsening economic crisis, he also faced the challenge of opposition from
the established Basque nationalist leaders during his term. Although Lopez’s leadership was

associated with the final ceasefire of ETA in October of 2011, he was losing the popular support
of the Basque people because of the enduring economic crisis and the harsh austerity measures;

he decided to hold the regional elections a day after the first anniversary of ETA’s ceasefire to
take advantage of the spirit of celebrating the end of terrorism in the Basque Country.
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The results of the Basque regional elections were in some ways similar to the results in Catalonia.
The Socialist Party of the Basque Country (PSE) lost political support and seats in the Basque
Parliament and radical leftist parties, such as Basque Country Gather (EHB), gained power in the
regional government. The leader of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) Ifigo Urkullu replaced
Patxi Lopez as the president of the Basque Country; although not openly separatist, his campaign
focused on calling for forging a new relationship with the Spanish government and more
autonomy for the Basque Country. “Although Urkullu has pledged to make the economy his first
priority, he was widely expected to follow the example of Catalan regional president Artur Mas
and call some kind of referendum on independence over the coming four years” (Tremlette 21
October 2012).
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Conclusion

“Though the reasons behind the desire for independence vary, and an individual cultural
and linguistic identity plays a vital role, it is almost always the economically strong

regions that want autonomy. Whether it's Catalonia, Southern Tyrolia in Italy, or Flanders
in Belgium, they all pay more into their respective national state coffers than they get out
of them and they all subsidize economically weaker areas” (Liitticke 2013).

Through the data presented in the previous chapters, I have shown that the economic crisis of
2008 encouraged support for separatism in the Spanish regions of the Basque Country and
Catalonia, which suggests that nationalist movements have an instrumental nature in modern-day
Spain. I have demonstrated that, despite the strong cultural identities of the Basques and the
Catalans, the desire for complete separation from the Spanish state declined significantly in the
two regions throughout the late 1990s as Spain entered a decade of rapid economic growth
(shown by dominance of center-right political parties that were against radical regional
separatism in the parliamentary elections). However, the support for separatism increased
drastically in the Basque Country and Catalonia during the global economic crisis of 2008,
which suggests that nationalist mobilization in the regions is merely a political tool to achieve a
certain economic end: an independent tax system for the Catalans and the right to implement
international agreements for the Basques. This instrumental view of modern nationalist
manifestations in the Basque Country and Catalonia has profound policy implications for the
central government of Spain as the leaders of the Cortes Generales struggle to find ways to
lessen the political tensions.
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